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Cotter & Co. v. United States: The Federal Circuit
Finds the Meaning of Subchapter T to be Less than
Cooperative
I. INTRODUCTION
The cooperative has existed as an operative business organization in the
American marketplace since the nineteenth century. For purposes of income taxation,
however, the cooperative association was not formally included under the income tax
laws until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1916. During the seven decades since
the passage of the Act, there has been an expansion in the types of organizations that
function on a cooperative basis., In fact, according to recent statistics, there are
approximately 41,000 agricultural and nonagricultural cooperatives operating in the
United States, generating revenues in excess of 163 billion dollars and having
memberships totalling 89.3 million.2 In conjunction with the increase in its use, the
tax laws applicable to the cooperative association have likewise evolved, culminating
most recently in the passage of Subchapter T of the Revenue Act of 1962. 3
Any organization that functions on a cooperative basis and meets the requirements
of Subchapter T is granted a tax advantage: it may deduct from its total gross income
those amounts returned to supporter-patrons if such payments are made proportionately
as patronage dividends on the basis of "business done with or for patrons" pursuant
to section 1388 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code).4 As a result, the
1. Originally, the United States tax laws recognized only the agricultural producer cooperative. Since the Revenue
Act of 1916, however, the list of the types of cooperatives has grown to include: I) consumer cooperatives; 2) marketing
cooperatives; 3) housing cooperatives; 4) business purchasing cooperatives; 5) utility cooperatives; 6) financial cooper-
atives; 7) labor unions; 8) trade associations; 9) self-help cooperatives; 10) insurance cooperatives; and 11) workers'
productive cooperatives. These are in addition to the agricultural organizations initially afforded special tax treatment. See
generally I. PAcaL, THE ORGoA,.Aio4 AND Ore'MON OF CooErATIves (4th ed. 1970).
2. U.S. DErr. oF Co.uuca, BuRoAu oF Tm CENsus, STATimcAL AB=Acr OFnM UNrnE STArEs: 1984, at 551, 667
(104th ed. 1983). See also U.S. DEr. oF Aorucustjet, Aoeict.1uRA. STAnsrlcs: 1983, at 449-51 (1983).
3. REveu Act or 1962, ch. 126, 76 Stat. 1051 (1962).
4. Recently, the Claims Court has decided Columbus Fruit and Vegetable Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 7
Cl. Ct. 561 (1985), in which it concluded:
The allowance of a deduction for patronage dividends "has not been placed upon the ground that cooperatives
are special creatures of statute under the tax laws, but is justified rather upon the theory that patronage
dividends are in reality rebates on purchases or deferred payments on sales . . . and thus do not constitute
taxable income to the cooperative." . . . The theory is that the cooperative is merely a conduit . . . or a
trustee for the dividends, which are at all times the property of the member stockholders. . . . The money
involved never belongs to the cooperative.
Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted). The net effect of Subchapter T is a lessening of the gross income generated by a
cooperative by reducing its total gross revenues by an amount equal to the payments made to patrons. These payments
are generally proportionate to the business activity between the cooperative and patron. One court has specifically
determined that the patronage dividend is not a deduction from gross income but is an exclusion therefrom. See
Mississippi Valley Portland Cement Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 827, 831 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, there may
continue to be validity to the contention of earlier commentators who treated the patronage dividend as a deduction from
earnings that are includible in gross income. See, e.g., Logan, Federal Income Taxation of Farmers' and Other
Cooperatives, 44 TEx. L. Rev. 250 (1965). This Comment is not directed to the resolution of the deductibility/excludibility
issue presented by these divergent approaches. Therefore, throughout this Comment the term "deduction" or "patronage
dividend deduction" will be used to indicate a subtraction from total gross revenues in reaching the total gross income
to the cooperative association. Essentially, the patronage dividend deduction will be treated as an exclusion from total
gross income.
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cooperative is able to reduce significantly its taxable income by returning to the
supporter-patrons the overcharges that had been incurred in their original purchases.
On June 26, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decided Cotter & Co. v. United States.5 The issue presented in this tax refund case
was the interpretation to be afforded the phrase "business done with or for patrons"
under I.R.C. section 1388 in determining the amount of patronage dividends that were
deductible from gross revenues. This calculation ultimately affected the net income
taxable to the cooperative under the corporate tax tables. Basing its opinion on a
facially similar case issued by its predecessor, the United States Court of Claims, the
Federal Circuit reversed the holding of the United States Claims Court. The court
asserted that the trial court "improperly read St. Louis Bank ... and the intent of
Congress.' '6 The court went on to say, however, that "the opinion of the trial court
was well reasoned and, were the court writing on a clean slate, it might be difficult
to refute. " 7
The appellate court read the terms of Subchapter T, in particular section 1388,
expansively and determined that interest income derived from commercial paper and
certificates of deposit and income accruing from the rental of warehouse space were
in fact earnings from business with patrons. Therefore, they were properly deductible
from gross revenues in the year in which they were returned as patronage-sourced
dividends. 8 The court was able to reach its conclusion by liberally applying the direct
relationship test set forth in St. Louis Bank for Cooperatives v. United States9 and by
expanding the literal construction of section 1388 to include those items of income that
were derived from activities undertaken by the cooperative for the benefit of its
member patrons.
This Comment explains the concept of institutional cooperation, explores the
evolution of the pertinent tax laws which have and continue to affect these organ-
izations, evaluates in part the holding of the Federal Circuit in Cotter, and argues in
favor of a more workable, less rigid test in applying the terms of Subchapter T to
nonfinancial consumer and producer cooperative associations. The two-tiered anal-
ysis presented in this Comment focuses primarily on interest income derived from the
investment of cooperative funds in revenue producing accounts. Simultaneously, other
activities not directly occurring between cooperative and patron but which also gen-
erate income are to be included in applying the proposed test, but are only tangentially
discussed. This Comment will attempt to integrate the basic purpose of the association
and the income-generating activity in which the cooperative is engaged by way of a
test that would permit Subchapter T treatment for those sources of earnings, produced
outside the relationship of cooperative and patron, that are necessary and integrally
intertwined with the basic functions of the association. Essentially, a court would be
required to look to the function of the revenue-producing activity in relation to the basic
5. 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'g, 6 CI. Ct. 219 (1984).
6. Id. at 1103.
7. Id. at 1105.
8. Id. at 1107-10.
9. 624 F.2d 1041 (Ct. C1. 1980).
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functions of the association in order to determine if the income derived therefrom was
the result of business done with or for patrons (patronage sourced) and thereby subject
to the favorable tax treatment of Subchapter T.
II. DEFINING ThE COOPERATIVE
In order to realize the significance of the application of Subchapter T in Cotter,
it is important to understand the purposes and functions for which the cooperative
organization was originally created. A cooperative association or corporation is an
enterprise owned by and operated primarily for the benefit of those using its
services.10 The reason for its existence is to help members serve themselves.1" A
cooperative is not organized for the production of profit attributable to the enterprise
itself.' 2 Rather, the cooperative is an association "which furnishes an economic
service without entrepreneur or capital profit."1 3 As a result, profit, which is the
mainspring of commerce, is the antithesis of the concept of cooperation. 14
To define a cooperative association through the application of specific
characteristics is difficult. As Justice Brandeis pointed out in Frost v. Corporation
Commission,15 "[N]o one plan of organization is to be labeled as truly cooperative
to the exclusion of others."' 16 Nevertheless, a common thread is present. All
cooperatives are owned and controlled on a substantially equal basis by those for
whom the association is rendering service. 17 The enterprise is established by
individuals "to provide themselves with goods and services or to produce and
dispose of the products of their labor."' s G. Harold Powell, a noted scholar on the
10. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 306-07 (1965). For a more detailed
explanation of the cooperative as a business organization, see generally I. Pacm, Ttm LAW OF CooPsA'rmV (3d ed. 1956).
11. I. PAcKE, supra note 10, at 207.
12. BlAcK's LaW DiCno.ARv 302 (5th ed. 1979); I. PAcKEL, supra note 10, at 248.
13. Packel, What is a Cooperative?, 14 Tare. L.Q. 60, 61 (1939).
14. Henderson, Cooperative Marketing Associations, 23 CoLusm. L. REv. 91, 111 (1923).
15. 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
16. Id. at 546 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Packel, supra note 13, at 61. Packel, a noted authority on cooperatives, has characterized the cooperative
organization to include one or more of the following attributes: (1) substantially equal control over management of the
association by each of the associates; (2) substantially equal ownership interest by each of the associates; (3) associateship
which is limited to those who will avail themselves of the services furnished by the association; (4) prohibited or limited
transfer of ownership interest; (5) capital investment which receives little or no return; (6) economic benefits which pass
to the associates on a substantially equal basis or on the basis of their patronage of the association; (7) nontermination of
the association by death, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of one or more associates; and (8) services of the association furnished
primarily for the use of the associates. I. PAci., supra note 10, at 3-4; Packel, supra note 13, at 61.
18. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305-06 (1965). Membership in a cooperative
organization confers certain legal rights upon the member. Simultaneously, membership imposes definite responsibilities.
Members of an association should provide adequate financing, support the business through full patronage, elect
competent directors, keep themselves informed on association affairs, and cooperate in fulfilling their agreements and the
commitments of the association. The relationship between the members of the association is more intimate and personal
than that between corporations and their stockholders. The cooperative has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
its members. See Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., Inc., 230 A.D. 571, 573, 245 N.Y.S. 432, 434 (1930) ("The status
of the parties partakes of a trust or fiduciary character, and is not the simple relation of vendor and vendee.").
Membership in a stock cooperative is obtained through the purchase of at least one share of its stock and the meeting
by the purchaser of any other requirements of the association. Membership in a nonstock cooperative is obtained through
application for membership and acceptance of the applicant by the association and the meeting of any other requirements.
A common requirement for both stock and nonstock associations is an agreement to take service or obtain supplies from
the cooperative, and in producer cooperatives the signing of a marketing contract is sometimes required. The members
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subject of cooperation, has compared the cooperative association with the
corporation for profit:
There is an essential difference between a cooperative organization and a capital stock
corporation operated for profit. A capital stock corporation for profit is founded on the
earning capacity of the capital invested, and that investment is the basis of administration
and control, and of the distribution of earnings. The cooperative organization, on the other
hand, is founded for the mutual benefit of the members, while the earnings or profits are
returned, not on the basis of the capital which each member has contributed, but rather on
the volume of his shipments, or his purchases .... The foundation of the cooperative
association is [membership] and ... each member has an equal voice in directing its
operations; but in the capital stock corporation for profit, the foundation is capital and the
voice of the stockholder in its direction is proportional to the capital contributed by him.
Therefore, a cooperative association, as contrasted with a profit-making organization, may
be tested by the motive underlying its operations. In the former, it is operated for the mutual
help of the members; in the latter, it is for the profit or advantage of the corporation itself.19
Economically, the corporation for profit seeks to benefit itself through its
operations. The economic welfare of the cooperative organization, however, is not
synonymous with financial savings or increased monetary returns. The cooperative
benefit concept is rooted in the relationships between the enterprise and its associates
and between the associates themselves. 20 The existence of the cooperative enterprise
is dependent upon the ability of the cooperative to further the purchasing, marketing,
or service activities of its members by and for whom the association was created.2'
The survival of a cooperative is contingent upon its ability to transact business with
those employing its services. As a result,
[t]he basic and distinguishing feature of a ... cooperative association, as compared
with a corporation-for-profit, is that in the case of a ... cooperative association the fruits
and increases which the worker-members produce through their joint efforts are "vested in
and retained by" the workers themselves, rather than in and by the association, as such,
which functions only as an instrumentality for the benefit of the workers; and that these fruits
and increases of the cooperative effort are then allocated among the active [members] as
patronage dividends, in proportion to their participation in producing [or consuming] the
same. 22
In a cooperative, all the members assume, in a broad sense, the economic risk.
By pooling their resources together, be it labor, capital, or goods, the members form
a single entity that is better able to purchase, market, or provide services for the
members as a group than each member could accomplish individually. The members
are not separate from the association. The members are the association. U.S. FmaRas CbopmAE SEx cE, LEGAL PnAsEs
OF FA, aER CooPzAxrvEs 10-12 (1976) (emphasis added) (hereinafter cited as LEAL PHAsES).
19. Statement of Mr. G. Harold Powell, AoRiCuvLntRAL ExpEiussmsr STAoN, UmrvaEsrrY oF CAnsase, ClmcuLA No.
222 (October, 1920), reprinted in CooPRA'vE MARKETING, LETTER osi Ta CHARMAN or Ta FEER.A TRADE Co'.SSIsxoN,
presented to 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (May 2, 1928).
20. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 309 (1965); Packel, supra note 13, at 62.
21. The cooperative is an effective organization in that "[t]he increased volume of business reduces the percentage
of overhead expense and increases the savings made in the business and therefore, also, the benefits accruing to each
member." U.S. DEPr. oF LABOR, Buuams op m Uumo STA~sS BuRAu OF LABOR STAms'cs No. 437, CooPEaArIvE MovEMENr
IN m UrTms STAT-s iN 1925 (OTHER TAN AOrucuLwuRAt) 27 (1927) [hereinafter cited as LABoR STArts'ncs]. For an explanation
of the function of the cooperative, see generally I. PACKEL, supra note 10.
22. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 309 (1965).
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do not contemplate a return for the undertaking of this risk.23 Rather, any excess
receipts attributable to the activities of the organization are to be returned to the
member-patron in proportion to such member's support of the cooperative relative to
the participation of all members in the association. 24 These returns are termed
"patronage dividends" for purposes of Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code.25
In a cooperative enterprise, the means of production and distribution are owned
in common and the earnings revert to the members, not on the basis of their
investment in the organization, but in proportion to their personal participation. As
such, the excess income received by the cooperative is independent of any capital
invested in the enterprise. Thus, the patronage dividend is not a true dividend. 26 The
refund to the member-patrons could more accurately be described as an overcharge. 27
Effectively, these refunds are not a division of profits but are a return of the
overcharges to the supporter-members of the association.28 "The patronage dividend
is as much a part of the transaction as the price itself.' 29 Such income does not
represent taxable income to the organization, but belongs at all times to its members
since the cooperative is merely the conduit through which the individual members
operate. 30
Although there are many types of cooperative associations, 31 from a functional
perspective cooperatives are of two basic types-producer cooperatives and con-
sumer cooperatives. 32 The producer cooperative is effective in benefiting the
members in their capacities as producers. 33 The function of the producer cooperative
involves not only the processing of goods supplied by the members, but also the
marketing of goods processed or produced. The member-patron, as a seller, is able
to use the cooperative association as a distribution mechanism through which his or
her products are introduced into the market. In addition to the relatively low overhead
23. "In cooperatives, there may be a return for the use of capital investment and even for the risk of loss, but there
is no contemplation of an additional return on capital based upon the potentialities or the actualities of successful
operation." I. PAcrt, supra note 10, at 3.
24. The patronage dividend is declared and distributed as follows:
[A]fter provision has been made for all [expenses of the cooperative], the remainder of the profits is returned
to the members in proportion to their patronage. The return of purchase dividends proportioned to the amount
of the member's business with the society is peculiar to the cooperative movement. This insures that the
member who does the most trading at the store shall receive the highest trade rebate, and the member whose
business with the store is small shall receive a proportionally small return. In other words, the system was
designed to reward the loyalty of the members in the exact degree of their loyalty.
LuOR STATsScs, supra note 21, at 57.
25. Subchapter T can be found at I.R.C. §§ 1381-88 (West 1962).
26. See Baltimore Equitable Soc'y v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 427, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1933). The court noted that
"patronage refunds are often labelled dividends, but that manifestly does not make them dividends within the meaning
of the Internal Revenue Code." Id.
27. I. PAcKEL, supra note 10, at 248.
28. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 307 (1965).
29. Midland Coop. Wholesale v. Ickes, 125 F.2d 618, 635 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 613 (1942).
30. Dr. P. Phillips Coop. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1002, 1010 (1950). Despite the fact that the excess income
is not derived for the benefit of the cooperative itself, under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, the amount of patronage dividends deductible in arriving at gross income is limited to those portions actually
returned to the members in proportion to their support. See I.R.C. § 1382 (West 1962).
31. See supra note 1.
32. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 309 (1965).
33. Id. at 306.
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costs applicable to the products, 34 the member-patron, by joining with others
distributing like products through the same or similar cooperatives, is able to realize
a higher selling price as a result of reduced competition. The net effect of lower
overhead costs and higher selling prices is a higher net income realized by the
members in their production activities.
The consumer cooperative association operates "for the benefit of the members
in their capacity as individual consumers."35 Acting as a purchasing agent for
individual consumers, the consumer cooperative is able to obtain goods (or services)
for its members at rates relatively lower than those attainable by the member-patrons
separately. As a result of the cooperative's ability to purchase items in quantity at
reduced marginal costs and because of relatively low overhead rates, 36 the consumer
cooperative effectively reduces the costs incurred by its members as consumers of
goods and services. This cost reduction allows members to realize greater net income
after expenses than would be achieved without the association. 37
Because the return of the overcharges to the members is as much a part of the
arrangement as the selling or buying price of the goods or services, 39 the net selling
or buying price to the patron is determinable only after the patronage dividend is
returned. With respect to the producer cooperative, the return of the overcharge is
treated essentially as a reduction in the gross receipts attributable to activities done for
the member-patron. Similarly, the consumer cooperative treats the patronage
dividend as a reduction in the cost of items purchased for and sold to its
supporter-patrons. 39 The entire transaction between the cooperative and its members
thereby involves a two-step process-the initial price resulting from the cooperative's
activity with the patron followed by a patronage dividend stemming from the payment
of a price in excess of that which should have been incurred by the patron in the
primary transaction. This method of operating on a nonprofit basis emphasizes the
absence of entrepreneurial profit and is expressed simply as "operation at cost,"''4 a
basic concept of the cooperative form of business.4t Thus, when the cooperative fails
to operate on a cost basis by not making patronage dividend payments and a profit has
been created, the association is treated in the same manner as a corporation for profit
34. See supra note 21.
35. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 306 (1965).
36. See supra note 21.
37. This proposition assumes that all factors related to the transaction remain constant.
38. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
39. In note 4 of this Comment, it was suggested that the patronage dividend was to be treated by the cooperative
as an exclusion from gross income by deducting it from total gross revenues. In Section Il of this Comment, it will be
shown that one of the functions of Subchapter T is the provision of a mechanism to tax some person with respect to these
returns. Because the patronage dividend is as much a part of the original transaction between cooperative and patron as
the price itself, the patronage dividend is not automatically to be included as an item of gross income to the patron. In
the producer cooperative, the patronage dividend is essentially an increase in the gross receipts of the member patron and,
as such, is properly includible in calculating total gross income to the patron. The consumer cooperative, on the other
hand, recognizes the patronage dividend as a reduction in the cost of the goods or services originally purchased. As a
result, the return of the overcharge is not an increase in gross income, but a lessening of the member patron's incurred
expenses.
40. LEUAL PHAS supra note 18, at 5..
41. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
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under the tax laws and is thereupon taxed according to the undistributed net profits
generated from its patronage operations. 42
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBCHAPTER T
After the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, 43 Congress enacted the Revenue
Act of 1913. 44 Although the 1913 Act did not specifically mention cooperative
associations, it did, nevertheless, exempt from taxation "agricultural and horticul-
tural organizations." 45 Initially, a Treasury Department ruling read this exemption as
including agricultural cooperatives by implication. 46 This Treasury Department
ruling was replaced soon thereafter by another ruling that concluded cooperative dairy
associations did not "fall within" the exemption. 47 In addition, this latter ruling was
extended to exclude from exemption other cooperative organizations as well. 48 These
initial rulings thus set forth the limited availability of beneficial tax laws to
agricultural cooperative organizations.
The formal introduction of the agricultural cooperative into the income tax laws
occurred with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1916. 49 The 1916 Act provided an
exemption, but limited it to those "farmers', fruit growers', or like association(s)" 5o
acting as producer cooperatives for their members.5 ' In the processing, marketing,
and selling of its members' goods, the agricultural producer cooperative acts as a
sales agent in doing business for its members. 52 Five years later, section 231 of the
Revenue Act of 192153 broadened the 1916 exemption to include agricultural
organizations acting as consumer cooperatives for their members.54 In the purchas-
ing, warehousing, and distribution of goods to its members, the agricultural consumer
42. See I.R.C. § 11(Ib) (West 1984) (setting levels of corporate tax).
43. The sixteenth amendment was passed in 1913 and provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVI.
44. REvewu Act op 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
45. Id. § 2(G)(a).
46. Treas. Reg. 62, located in 16 TREAs. DEc. lrrr. REv. 27 (1914).
47. T.D. 1969, 16 TREAS. Dec. INT. REv. 100 (1914).
48. See LeA!. Ptms, supra note 18, at 358.
49. REvamn Aer or 1916, ch. 463, § I1(a), 39 Stat. 767 (1916).
50. Id.
51. Id. See also Logan, supra note 4, at 285 (1965) (the Revenue Act of 1916 added a specific exemption from
taxation for a "farmers', fruit growers', or like association" that acted as sales agent to market produce of its members
at cost).
52. Logan, supra note 4, at 285.
53. REvEiu Act or 1921, ch. 136, § 231, 42 Stat. 253 (1921). Section 231(11) states in pertinent part:
Mhe following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this title -
(11) Farmers', fruit growers', or like associations, organized and operated as sales agents for the purpose of
marketing the products of members and turning back to them the proceeds of sales, less the necessary selling
expense, on the basis of the quantity of produce furnished by them; or organized and operated as purchasing
agents for the purpose of purchasing supplies and equipment for the use of members and turning over such
supplies and equipment to such members at actual cost, plus necessary expenses ....
Id.
54. Id. See also LoAL PrAsEs, supra note 18, at 359; Logan, supra note 4, at 285 ("In 1921 language was added
to exempt such a cooperative that was acting as purchasing agent to acquire 'supplies and equipment' at cost for the use
of its members.").
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cooperative acts as a purchasing agent in doing business with its members.5 5 The
exemption provided to both agricultural producer and consumer cooperatives under
the 1921 Revenue Act, which originated under the Revenue Act of 1916, permitted
the cooperative associations to exclude from gross income those amounts returned to
member patrons on the basis of their use of the organization in the sale and purchase
of agricultural goods.56 The exemption was permitted only when the dollar return was
based proportionately on the amount of business done eitherfor the patron or with the
patron.5 7 Thus, in order to qualify as a properly deductible distribution (now referred
to as a patronage dividend), the cooperative was required to return the overcharge on
the basis of the source of the income received in a transaction that initially involved
the basic selling and purchasing activities between the agricultural cooperative and its
member patron.
The language of section 231(11) of the Revenue Act of 1921 clearly indicated
that the exemption provided thereunder would be allowable only when the cooper-
ative association "operated as [a] sales agent.., for the purpose of marketing the
products of members" 58 or when it "operated as [a] purchasing agent ... for the
purpose of purchasing supplies and equipment for the use of members." 59 The terms
of section 231 (11) thus required that there be a direct functional relationship between
the activity undertaken by the cooperative and the member patron in order to qualify
the repayment of the overcharge as a patronage dividend. The ultimate effect of
allowing these cooperatives an exemption for patronage dividends returned to
member patrons was to increase the net income of the individual farmer, for whose
benefit the cooperative association had been created and with or for whom the
cooperative was now functioning. Absent this direct relationship between cooperative
and member patron, the association would no longer be functioning either as a sales
agent or a purchasing agent for the member. Therefore, any income to the cooperative
which was derived from activities not directly related to business done with or for
member patrons would not be derived from the basic functional activities of the
cooperative and thus would not be patronage sourced. As a result, such income would
not qualify for the exemption provided under section 231(11).
The importance of the direct relationship between the cooperative and the
member became even more apparent with the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1926.60
Section 231(12) of the 1926 Act6 ' stated that exemption status would be available
only if the amount of dealings with nonmembers was limited to fifteen percent of the
total business done by agricultural consumer cooperatives and fifty percent of the
business done by agricultural producer cooperatives. 62 Additionally, section 231(12),
55. LGAL PusAms, supra note 18, at 359; Logan, supra note 4, at 285.
56. See supra notes 49 and 53.
57. See supra note 24.
58. See supra note 53.
59. See id.
60. REvrn Acr OF 1926, ch. 27, § 231(12) pt. 2, 44 Stat. 40-41 (1926).
61. Id. § 231(12); accord Rev. Rul. 72-547, 1972-2 C.B. 511.
62. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 231(12) pt. 2, 44 Stat. 40-41 (1962). By permitting nonmember participation
in the producer cooperative to include up to 50 percent of the total business done by the cooperative, Congress apparently
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which is substantially identical to present section 521,63 retained much of the same
language as section 231(11) of the 1921 Revenue Act by requiring that in order to
qualify for an exemption the cooperative must either operate "for the purpose of
marketing the products of members," 64 or operate "for the purpose of purchasing
supplies and equipment for the use of members." 65 Thus, the language of these
original income tax provisions specifically limited the permissible exemption to those
activities of the cooperative involving the marketing or purchasing of goods for the
patron,6 which by implication requires a direct agency relationship between the
organization and the patron. 67 Fundamentally, the relationship between the transac-
tion and the member patron must be functionally direct insofar as the members
constitute the association, 63 and any activity undertaken by the cooperative must be
in furtherance of the interests of its members. 69
Following the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1934,70 which recodified the
treatment of cooperative associations under section 101(12)71 and section 101(13),72
the first detailed treatment of the exemptions allowed cooperatives was expressed in
the Revenue Act of 1951.73 Through the passage of section 314 of the 1951 Act,7 4 the
federal tax statutes, for the first time, gave express recognition to the principle that
both exempt cooperative associations and nonexempt cooperative associations were
entitled to exclude true patronage dividends from their gross incomes. 75 Under this
legislation, cooperatives were allowed to reduce their gross revenues by amounts
allocated and distributed as patronage dividends, and patrons were to be currently
taxed on the patronage dividends distributed to them arising out of the "business
activities" of the cooperative.
In order for a refund to qualify as a patronage dividend, it was required that the
earnings of the cooperative arise out of its business activities. That is, the income had
to be derived out of transactions that were patronage sourced. Yet the amorphous
nature of the term "business activities" of the cooperative was not without
boundaries under section 314. Senate Bill 892, introduced by Senator Williams of
Delaware, provided that the applicability of section 314 was to be limited as follows:
Sec. 431. Tax of cooperative corporations.
was attempting to lessen competition between member and nonmember producers in the marketing of their goods.
Ultimately, such competition would drive pri es for goods downward, resulting in a reduction in income not only to the
member of the cooperative, but also to the competing nonmember. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
63. I.R.C. § 521 (West 1954).
64. Id. § 521(b)(1).
65. Id.
66. The term "patron" includes any person with or for whom a cooperative does business on a cooperative basis,
whether a stockholder, member, or nonmember of the cooperative, and whether or not a natural person. In general,
however, a patron is construed to be a member of the association. See supra note 18.
67. See supra notes 51 and 54.
68. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
69. See id.
70. REvviua Acr oF 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680 (1934).
71. Id. § 101(12), at 701.
72. Id. § 101(13), at 701-02.
73. Rvam Act oF 1951, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452 (1951).
74. Id. § 314, at 491-93.
75. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1951).
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(a) In general. -
(2) Net income: In computing the net income of a cooperative corporation there shall
be excluded patronage dividends paid or payable to patrons, but only if -
(A) The activities of such corporation during the whole of the taxable year did not
extend beyond (i) marketing commodities acquired solely from members, and transactions
ordinarily and necessarily incident to such marketing, or (ii) selling goods or commodities
to, or performing services for, members, and transactions ordinarily and necessarily
incident to such sales or services .... 76
The bill further provided:
Sec. 431. Tax on cooperative corporations.
(a) In general. -
(2) Net income: In computing the net income of a cooperative corporation there shall
be exluded patronage dividends paid or payable to patrons, but only if -
(C) Such patronage dividends are derived exclusively from marketing commodities
acquired from members, or the sale of goods or commodities to or performance of services
for, members, or from transactions ordinarily and necessarily incident to such marketing,
sales, or services .... 77
Senate Bill 892 was intended to address the increasing use of the cooperative
form of organized business and the resulting loss of revenue to the United States
which occurred as a result of the exemption provided under sections 101(11) and
101(12) of the Revenue Act of 1934.78 Such concern was expressed eight years
earlier in a report submitted to the House Committee on Ways and Means. 79
According to the Treasury Department, there had been increasing pressure, especially
from corporations, to repeal the exemption permitted to cooperatives pursuant to
sections 101(11) and 101(12) of the Revenue Act of 1934. According to the report,
a major concern of noncooperative organizations was their inability to compete with
cooperatives since cooperatives were exempted from income taxation up to the
amounts distributed as patronage dividends.80 Congress finally addressed these
concerns in section 314 of the Revenue Act of 195181 by limiting and defining the
exclusions allowed cooperatives to those transactions done in the furtherance of or
ordinarily and necessarily incidental to the marketing, purchasing, and service
76. 97 CoNG. REc. 1317 (1951) (statement of Sen. Williams referring to S. 892) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See generally id. (the purpose of the proposed bill is to repeal certain inequities in the income tax laws as related
to cooperative organizations).
79. Divssos oF TAx REsEAR cH, U.S. TREAsuRY DEPARTMENr, THE TAxAmo- or FA.mRS' CooPmA-lvE AssocsaAoxs,
Submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, at hearings entitled "Revenue Revision of
1943," cited in U.S. RsvEwJE Acts, 1909-1950, THE LAws, LEIsLATmI HISoRY & AOanmsninvE DocuM, n, Vol. 123.
Although this report dealt specially with farmers' cooperative organizations, the Treasury Departnent asserted that "the
essential tax principles previously discussed are fully applicable [to other cooperative associations] despite surface
differences in actual methods of operation and organization." Id. at 41.
80. Id. at 1-40.
81. REvEJuE Act oF 1951, ch. 521, § 314, 65 Stat. 491 (1951). Despite the fact that section 314 followed from
section 101(12) of the 1934 Act, any exemption allowed a nonexempt cooperative association was merely implied.
Congress had yet to formally address the taxation of the nonexempt organization operating on a cooperative basis.
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activities of the cooperative. As a result, income derived from these activities was
defined to be patronage sourced.8 2
Three years after the enactment of section 314 of the Revenue Act of 1951,
Congress passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.83 In addition to I.R.C. section
521, which specifically was added as a result of the exemptions allowed to
nonexempt cooperatives under section 314 of the 1951 Act,84 Congress effectively
replaced the section 314 exemption with section 522.85 The purpose of section 522,
like that of its predecessor, was to increase revenues otherwise lost through the
income tax provisions dealing with cooperative associations. Additionally, the
deductibility of patronage dividends from gross income under section 522 was limited
to those transactions done in the furtherance of or ordinarily and necessarily
incidental to the marketing, purchasing, and service activities of the cooperative. It
was generally thought that earnings of cooperatives would thereby be currently
taxable, to the extent they reflected business activity, either to the cooperatives or to
the patrons.8 6 Soon after the enactment of the 1954 Code, however, it became
apparent that section 522 was inadequate in ensuring that income would be taxable to
either the cooperative or the patron in the year in which it was earned. Two prominent
cases, Commissioner v. Carpenter7 and Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,88 demonstrated that it was possible under the 1954 Code for the cooperative
to deduct the patronage dividend as having been paid, and yet, for personal income
tax purposes, the member might avoid taxation by either showing that a noncash
patronage dividend had a fair market value to him or her of zero89 or recording
income on an accrual basis where the patronage dividend was not a properly
accruable item.90 These decisions, although contrary to congressional intent under-
lying the Revenue Act of 1951 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, forced
Congress to close this loophole to allow this income to be taxed either to the
cooperative or to the patron in the year in which the patronage refunds were made. 91
The result was the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962.92
82. The purpose of section 314 of the 1951 Revenue Act was not to expand the applicability of the patronage
dividend deduction to income which was generated outside the direct relationship between cooperative and patron. Rather,
the enactment of section 314 occurred as a result of Congress' desire to enlarge the scope of cooperative treatment to both
exempt and nonexempt associations. Section 314, like its predecessors, limited the deductibility of any dividends to those
that were patronage sourced. Thus, the implicit nature of the exemption is supported not only by the evolution of section
314 (see supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text), but also through ase law (see, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944) (transaction must not be merely incidental to cooperative associations' overall profit)) and by
congressional history (see supra text accompanying notes 75-77).
83. I.R.C. §§ 1-8023 (West 1954).
84. Id. § 521; Logan, supra note 4, at 286.
85. I.R.C. § 522 (West 1954).
86. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-82 (1962).
87. 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955).
88. 249 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1957).
89. Commissioner v. Carpenter, 219 F.2d 635, 636 (5th Cir. 1955).
90. Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 726, 729-31 (4th Cir. 1957).
91. In 1953, the Treasury Department for the first time included a section on the taxability of patronage refunds
to patrons in its formal tax regulations. See T.D. 6014, 1953-1 C.B. 11O; 26 C.F.R. § 39.22(a)-23 (1954). These
regulations were supplemented in 1954 by Rev. Rul. 54-10, 1954-1 C.B. 24. Nevertheless, the Carpenter and Long
Poultry Farms decisions were effective in nullifying the applicability of these regulations and rulings.
92. REvmm Act oF 1962, ch. 126, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
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The Revenue Act of 1962 repealed section 522 and replaced it with the
provisions of Subchapter T.93 As a result, the provisions of section 521, which
remained in effect after the passage of the 1962 Act, were integrated into Subchapter
T through section 1381 of the Code, 94 while the treatment for cooperative associa-
tions other than exempt farmers' cooperatives was contained almost entirely within
the provisions of Subchapter T.95 The sole purpose for the enactment of Subchapter
T was to obtain a single current tax with respect to the income of the cooperative,
either at the level of the cooperative or at the level of the patron.96 As a result of the
interaction of section 138297 with section 1385,98 the provisions of Subchapter T, by
defining and limiting the types of payments that would qualify as patronage dividends
upon distribution to the patrons, prevented income tax avoidance by both coopera-
tives and patrons in response to Carpenter99 and Long Poultry Farms.1' o
Pragmatically, the enactment of Subchapter T was not intended to be an
alteration of the tax treatment afforded cooperative associations by defining and
limiting the patronage dividend deduction to income originating and derived from the
direct relationship between cooperative and patron. In fact, in defining the term
"patronage dividend," section 1388(a) excluded any refunds to the extent that they
were paid out of earnings not derived from "business done with or for patrons."1o1
This language, therefore, was clearly synonymous with the legislative intent,
previously described, of restricting the deductibility of patronage dividends to those
transactions of the cooperative that were in furtherance of or ordinarily and
necessarily an incident to the marketing, purchasing, or service activities between the
association t02 and the member patron.103
As a result of the Revenue Act of 1951, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and
the Revenue Act of 1962, it is apparent that Congress not only intended to become
increasingly more restrictive regarding patronage dividend treatment by limiting the
93. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83, 1385, 1388 (1962).
94. See I.R.C. § 1381(a)(1) (West 1962) which states that the provisions of Subchapter T apply to "any 'exempt'
farmers' cooperative" which is subject to the terms of I.R.C. § 521 (West 1954).
95. It must be noted here that in addition to I.R.C. §§ 138143, 1385 and 1388, other provisions in the Code dealt
specially with certain types of cooperative associations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(12) (West 1954); I.R.C. § 216 (West
1954).
96. H.R. RP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1962).
97. I.R.C. § 1382 (West 1962). Section 1382(b)(1) provides:
In determining the taxable income of an organization to which this part applies, there shall not be taken into
account amounts paid during the payment period for the taxable year-
(1) as patronage dividends (as defined in section 1388(a)), to the extent paid in money, . . .or other
property . . . with respect to patronage occurring during such taxable year,
For purposes of this title, any amount not taken into account under the preceding sentence shall, in the case
of an amount described in paragraph (I)... be treated in the same manner as an item of gross income and
as a deduction therefrom (and not as a deduction in arriving at gross income).
Id. § 1382(b)(1).
98. I.R.C. § 1385 (West 1962). Essentially, I.R.C. § 1385 states that if a patronage dividend deduction which
conforms to the requirements of I.R.C. §§ 1382 and 1388 is taken by the cooperative, then the patron who received the
dividend must include it in his or her taxable income in the same amount and year it was deducted by the cooperative.
99. 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955).
100. 249 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1957).
101. I.R.C. § 1388(a) (West 1962).
102. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 18.
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scope of activities from which income derived would be considered as patronage
sourced, but has also demonstrated a desire to increase revenues by taxing some
person' 4 at some determinable point. In spite of the expanded use of the cooperative
association as a form of organized business,10 5 Congress essentially has committed
the cooperative into becoming more responsible for the fulfillment of the purpose for
which it was created-the furtherance of the economic welfare of its members
through its operations-by limiting the deductibility of payments to patrons to those
income producing activities that are patronage sourced. 0 6
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF I.R.C. SECrON 1388
A. Connecting Prior Law to Present Terms
Subchapter T of the Revenue Code of 1962, from a semantical analysis, differed
remarkably from previous tax laws applicable to cooperative organizations. The Fifth
Circuit nevertheless determined that "Subchapter T merely restated prior
law." o10 7 The preceding section of this Comment demonstrated that the scope and
effect of sections 1381 through 1388 of the present Code were to remain consistent
with the tax statutes that preceded them. As a result, the Fifth Circuit was able to
conclude that the problem "Subchapter T was designed to correct was the
situation... in which the patronage dividend escaped taxation altogether.' ' 0 8
Despite the direct correlation between Subchapter T and its predecessor Code
sections, a major obstacle has impaired the abilities of some courts to define the
boundaries of Subchapter T in response to the terminology existing within section
1388(a).1 9 Prior to the enactment of the 1962 Revenue Code, the excludibility of
monies returned to patrons, now referred to as patronage dividends, was limited to
those amounts paid out of revenues derived from transactions in furtherance of and
ordinarily and necessarily incidental to the basic functions of the cooperative.10
Section 1388(a) of the Code, on the other hand, although intended to reach the same
organizations in a functionally equivalent manner, requires that in order to be
considered patronage sourced and thus qualify as a deductible patronage dividend for
purposes of section 1382,"' the earnings of the cooperative association must be
derived from "business done with or for patrons."' 1 2
104. "Person" is defined at I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (West 1954).
105. See supra notes 70-73, 83-86, and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
107. Coastal Chem. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 110, 117 (5th Cir. 1977).
108. Id. at 115.
109. I.R.C. § 1388(a) (West 1986).
110. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
111. I.R.C. § 1382 (West 1986).
112. Internal Revenue Code section 1388(a) states:
(a) Patronage dividend
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "patronage dividend" means an amount paid to a patron by an
organization to which part I [of] this subchapter applies-
(1) on the basis of quantity or value of business done with or for such patron,
(2) under an obligation of such organizations to pay such amount, which obligation existed before the
organization received the amount paid, and
1986]
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From a grammatical perspective, section 1388(a) can be dissected into two
components: (1) business done with the patron; and (2) business donefor the patron.
The phrase "business done with . . . patrons" 13 initially connotes a direct connec-
tion between the cooperative organization and the member patron-a functional
relationship between the activity of the association and that of the patron. 114
Moreover, the word "with" indicates that the organization is acting in the capacity
of a consumer cooperative-one whose basic functions include the purchase,
warehouse, sale, and distribution of goods with its member patrons. Similarly, the
term "business done.., for patrons" 115 applies also to correlative activity of
cooperative to patron. In the performance of its basic functions, the producer
cooperative must transact business for the patron. The organization maintains an
agency relationship with the patron in that the association is no more than an
extension of the patron (member). Although the association must deal with the
patron, primarily, in order to fulfill its functional responsibilities, the tax analysis
must occur at the time it performs its basic marketing, purchasing, selling, or service
activities. Thus, for both the consumer and producer cooperative, the language of
Subchapter T is designed to remain consistent with the functional relationship of
cooperative to patron. "Business done with the patron" is applicable only to
consumer cooperatives. Likewise, the producer association is analytically limited to
"business done for the patron." In order to determine if income is patronage sourced
and thereby deductible as a patronage dividend, any income, direct or incidental,
accruing to the consumer cooperative is to be examined under the "business done
with the patron" approach. In a similar manner, any revenue derived from direct or
incidental activities of a producer cooperative is to be analyzed from the perspective
of "business done for the patron." 116
B. Different Courts, Different Theories
Recent federal court opinions have indicated judicial difficulties in interpreting
the phrase "business done with or for patrons" in I.R.C. section 1388(a). This is
(3) which is determined by reference to the net earnings of the organization from business done with or for its
patrons.
Such term does not include any amount paid to a patron to the extent that (A) such amount is out of earnings
other than from business done with or for patrons, or (B) such amount is out of earnings from business done
with or for other patrons to whom no amounts are paid or to whom smaller amounts are paid, with respect to
substantially identical transactions.
I.R.C. § 1388(a) (West 1986).
113. See id.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 58-69.
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116. The general support for this bifurcated method of examination exists in the legislative evolution of Subchapter
T discussed in Part III. See supra text accompanying notes 43-106. Semantically, the letter of section 1388(a) would
protect against the interchange of terms to accommodate the interests of the cooperative. The language is connected to the
basic functions of the cooperative in such a way as to prevent an expansive application of the phrase "business done with
or for patrons" pursuant to section 1388(a). Thus, business done for the patron does not include that which is
economically beneficial to either cooperative or patron or both. The analysis to be employed must focus upon (1) the type
of cooperative involved; (2) the basic functions of the cooperative; (3) the activity generating the income; and (4) the
connection between the revenue created and the basic functions of the association in the fulfillment of the fiduciary
responsibilities owed to the member patron(s). Accord infra text accompanying note 120.
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particularly true when income is produced through transactions between the cooper-
ative association and third parties that prove to be beneficial to the cooperative, and
thus to the patron indirectly. Differing theories of analysis have resulted in disparate
answers, thereby creating confusion and insecurity in the Subchapter T arena.' 1 7
1. Cotter & Co. in the Claims Court
The divergent methodologies and rationales created by different courts is easily
recognizable in the recent case of Cotter & Co. v. United States."8 At the trial level,
the United States Claims Court looked initially to the basic functions of the
association and found:
Cotter serves its members by purchasing products on the best possible terms through its large
volume purchasing power and then by warehousing and distributing the products to its
members at the lowest possible cost for resale to their customers in a manner which meets
their needs. These functions achieve significant cost savings ... which are ultimately
passed through to members in the form of patronage dividends.' 19
Accordingly, the court reasoned that "the test that this court must apply is not
whether the income in question accrues to the benefit of the patrons, but rather, it is
whether said income is 'incidental income derived from sources not directly related
to the marketing, purchasing, or service activites of the cooperative associa-
tion." ' 120 As a result, Judge Gibson concluded that "the sharp focus of the court's
inquiry, in determining whether income is patronage sourced, should be on whether
the 'transactions which produced the income facilitate the basic functions of the
cooperative in some way other than simple money management or overall
profitability.'" 121
At issue in Cotter were three separate sources of income that the plaintiff
taxpayer claimed were deductible as patronage dividends pursuant to Subchapter T.
These were: (1) investment income derived from short-term certificates of deposit and
commercial paper; (2) rental income from the lease of excess warehouse space; and,
(3) rental income from the lease of a loop sprinkler system in one of plaintiff's
warehouses.1 22 Ultimately, the Claims Court held that "applicable law requires that
the cooperative establish a connection [direct or indirect] between the transaction that
produced the income and the basic services . . . " for which the cooperative was
117. Compare, e.g., St. Louis Bank for Coop. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1045 (Ct. CI. 1980) (the court
applied a "directly related" test) with Twin County Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 657, 659-62 (1983) (the trial
court employed a test which looked, not to relatedness, but to the facilitation of the basic functions of the cooperative).
118. 6 Cl. Ct. 219 (1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 1102 (1985).
119. Id. at 223.
120. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original). The Claims Court further noted in its opinion:
[I]f Congress had intended the term "with or for patrons" to be unlimited in scope, all income produced by
cooperatives that is passed through to patrons would be, in essence, income obtainedfor patrons, and would,
therefore, be considered patronage sourced. Both the legislative history of Subehapter T and the regulations
applicable thereto clearly show, however, that Congress had no such intention.
Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 228 (quoting Twin County Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 657, 662 (1983)) (emphasis in
original) (brackets omitted).
122. Id. at 226.
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formed to render. 123 Unable to find this connection with respect to the investment
income and the revenue generated from the lease of warehouse space, the court
opined that only the rental income from the lease of the sprinkler system constituted
business done with or for patrons 124 and was therefore patronage sourced. Unfortu-
nately, the court did not specifically determine from what standpoint, business done
with the patron or business done for the patron, its decision had been reached. It was
clearly stated, nonetheless, that the beneficial effect of the source of the income was
of no consequence in its final determination. 125
2. Cotter Reaches the Federal Circuit-A Different Forum Plus an Alternative
Rationale Equals the Opposite Answer
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the holding of the trial court with respect
to the investment and warehouse rental earnings, stating: "Consideration of the
relatedness of a transaction to a cooperative's function must be undertaken by
viewing the business environment to which it is arguably related." 126 By focusing on
the interaction of business transactions in regard to the aggregate activity of the
association from a financial necessity perspective, the court reasoned that the
imposition of a tax on income derived from activities that were, in a business context,
economically essential would, in fact, be a penalty.12 7
Philosophically, the means employed by the appellate court in reaching its
conclusion differed dramatically from the method of analysis used by the trial court.
Whereas the Claims Court applied a test to each transaction in relation to the basic
purchasing, marketing, and service activities between the cooperative and patron, the
Federal Circuit read section 1388(a) more expansively to include items of income that
were generated in furtherance of the basic functions of the cooperative. 128 The court
remarked: "The activity producing the income may not be so narrowly defined as to
limit it only to its income-generating characteristic when such a characterization is
not consistent with the actual activity."1 2 9 It thereby indicated that the connection to
be made was to occur between the income-generating activities and the basic
123. Id. at 230 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 231-32.
125. See id. at 228 (in which the court defined "incidental income").
126. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'g 6 CI. Ct. 219 (1984).
127. Id. at 1105.
128. Both the trial and appellate courts in Cotter relied on Revenue Ruling 69-576, 1969-2 C.B. 166, when
focusing on the functional approach to be applied under Subchapter T. The Claims Court viewed the Ruling narrowly,
thereby limiting the issue before it to whether the "transaction . . . actually facilitates the accomplishment of the
cooperatives' marketing, purchasing, or service activities. ... Cotter & Co. v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 219, 228
(1984) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit, instead of employing a
transactional approach, stated that "[t]he inquiry concerns the direct relationship of the income-generating activities to the
cooperative function." Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The direct relationship test
to be used, the court continued, is applicable only "by considering the immediate transaction at issue in light of its
relationship to other activities undertaken.'" Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the circuit court interpreted Subchapter T
patronage-sourced income to include earnings derived from transactions that facilitated, directly or indirectly, the basic
functions of the association. By comparison, the trial court's inquiry would essentially limit the question of relatedness
to whether the transaction itself facilitated the basic functions of the cooperative, thus defined to be directly related to the
marketing, purchasing, or source activities rendered by the cooperative.
129. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
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cooperative functions.' 30 As a result of its more liberal approach, the Federal Circuit
was able to conclude that "the income at issue was earned from business done for
patrons.' 1 3' By applying the mode of analysis used by its predecessor court in St.
Louis Bank for Cooperatives v. United States,132 the appellate court determined that
"[a]ny income generated in this way [interest income from the investment of
surplus funds and rental income from the lease of excess warehouse space] is
considered the result of business done 'for patrons."'133 As will be demonstrated,
this determination actually negates the policies behind the enactment of section
1388(a) and extends the deductibility of income to funds not originally contemplated
by Congress.
V. CorrER & Co.: A POTENTAL STEPPING STONE TRANSFORMED INTO A
STUMBLING BLOCK
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of patronage derivation in Cotter through
an acutely focused business necessity rationale. The court stated that "under existing
economic conditions.., the cooperative does what it must do."' 34 In essence, the
court indicated that the economic realities of the situation demanded that the
cooperative employ extrafunctional, revenue-generating activities which qualified as
patronage-sourced income. 135 The appellate court, in reversing the decision of the
lower court, suggested that the legislative history relied on by the trial court was
"ambiguous. "1 36 Furthermore, the circuit court determined that "the Claims Court
misapplied the analysis set forth in St. Louis Bank. '137
By placing its reliance on the holding of its predecessor court in St. Louis Bank,
the Federal Circuit displayed not only its inability to aggregate the legislative history
underlying Subchapter T, but also its lack of understanding of the inherent functional
differences of financial versus consumer cooperations. Moreover, by equating
business intelligence and economic efficiency with income tax excludibility under the
Code, the court misdirected its point of inquiry to profit maximization and
consequently removed the focal point of analysis from the nature of the services
provided by cooperative associations and placed its emphasis on the benefit that was
to result to the patron. This expansive approach undermined the intent of Congress,
disregarded the purpose and theory of cooperatives, and, as a result, added
indefiniteness to the application and scope of Subchapter T.
130. See supra note 128.
131. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
132. 624 F.2d 1041 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
133. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 1105.
135. At one point in its opinion the court went so far as to take judicial notice of the fact that "anyone managing
temporarily surplus funds for others is expected to realize on the fruits available in the form of interest, and not to do so
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A. The Appellate Court Applied the Literal Terms of Section 1388(a) Improperly
From its inception, the purpose of the cooperative form of organized business
has been and continues to be the furtherance of the economic welfare of its
members. 38 Yet "economic welfare does not merely refer to financial savings or
increased monetary returns. It cuts much deeper and goes to the whole relationship
of man to man in his economic life."' 139 It is the direct relationship between
organization and patron that is the core of the concept of cooperation. 140 The member
is the association; the association is merely an agent for the member.' 4' The reason
for the existence of a cooperative is to help the members serve themselves. 42
The critical focal point from which to view the business activities of a
cooperative organization is nested in the type of service(s) which it performs.
Therefore, when interpreting the language of Subchapter T, judicial recognition must
be given to the true character of the cooperative, the nature of its operations, and the
economic function that it performs in helping its members serve themselves. 43 In
conjunction therewith the allowance of a deduction (or exclusion)' 44 pursuant to the
provisions of Subchapter T does not turn on general equitable considerations. Rather,
it depends upon legislative grace. 145 Thus, any statute which reduces the amount of
income subject to taxation is to be read restrictively so as to limit the deductibility of
items to that specifically identified by the legislature. 146
A basic axiom of the tax laws is that when interpreting a statute, a court must
"construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress."' 47 The
evolution of Subchapter T, as reviewed above, 148 shows that while Congress has
expanded the use of the cooperative as a form of business, it simultaneously has
restricted the availability of patronage dividend deductions in order that the
association become more responsive to the purpose for which it was created. 149
Congressional intent under section 314 of the Revenue Act of 1951 and section 522
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the predecessors to current section 1388(a),
was to limit the deductibility of patronage dividends to those earnings that occurred
in furtherance of or were ordinarily and necessarily an incident to the basic functions
of the cooperative. 50 Accordingly, the term "business done with or for patrons"
under section 1388(a), in order to be applied properly, must be read against the
background from which it derived its contextual significance.
138. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
139. Packel, supra note 13, at 62.
140. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 305, 305-07 (1965) (the enterprise is established
by individuals to provide themselves with goods and services or to produce and dispose of the products of their labor).
141. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
142. I. PAcxm, supra note 10, at 207.
143. Id. at 207-08.
144. See supra note 4.
145. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1969); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940).
146. See supra note 145. Accord Palmer v. State Comm'n of Revenue and Taxation, 154 Kan. 690, 696, 135 P.2d
899, 903-04 (1943) (addressing the deductibility of items from gross revenues pursuant to state income tax statutes).
147. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
148. See supra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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It was suggested in Part IV of this Comment that the phrase "business done
with... patrons" is applicable only to consumer cooperatives.1t Any patronage-
sourced income generated by the association, either derived directly from the
operations of the organization with the members or indirectly produced as an
ordinary and necessary incident to its basic functions, is the result of business done
with the patron. In a similar manner, the term "business done.., for patrons" has
effect only on those cooperatives acting in a producer capacity. 152 All
patronage-sourced income accruing to the producer cooperative, directly or as a
necessary incident to its basic functions, is to be analyzed from the perspective of
business donefor the patron. Once the type of cooperative is established, all revenue
created therein is to be subject to the bifurcation of section 1388(a). The scheme and
effectiveness of Subchapter T exist in the separability of the consumer from the
producer cooperative, and the application of the subchapter rests primarily on this
differentiation.
The functional operations of the consumer cooperative are inherently different
from those of the producer association. Therefore, the semantic independence written
in the statute causes the means of analysis for each to be mutually exclusive of the
other. This methodology not only provides a restrictive interpretation of the
applicable statute, but also ensures a more responsive means of finding the requisite
direct correlation of cooperative to patron. Simultaneously, this approach fulfills the
intent of Subchapter T as expressed by Congress. 153 The dissection of I.R.C. section
1388(a) into two separate, independent components is a functional requirement that
has resulted from the innate differences between the two basic types of cooperatives.
To remove the mutual exclusivity of the two parts of the statute as they are to be
applied inaccurately reads the letter and purpose of Subchapter T.
The Federal Circuit applied the language of Subchapter T to the appellant,
Cotter, by stating that the "[tiaxpayer acts for its patrons" 15 4 and concluding that
"the income at issue was earned from business done for patrons." 155 The analytical
framework erected by the appellate court in Cotter addressed, in a literal sense, a
producer cooperative-one that does business for its members. Paradoxically, the
court recognized that the organization was consumer in nature. Its basic function
included the purchase, warehouse, and sale of goods to its member patrons.' 56
Therefore, the proper focus of the court should have been from the perspective of the
consumer cooperative. Pragmatically, income to a consumer cooperative, such as
Cotter, which is the result of either the direct interaction of cooperative and patron or
indirect activity between the association and third persons is to be resolved through
the analytical lens of business done with patrons, not business donefor them. The fact
that incidental income may be produced for the benefit of the patron, even though it
151. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
154. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
155. Id. at 1107.
156. Id. at 1104.
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results in higher economic efficiency, is not sufficient in and of itself to create a
mutation in the standard of resolution to be employed. 157
The investment and rental incomes received by the association in Cotter were
outside of the direct relationship of cooperative and patron. As a source of indirect
earnings, the court indicated that there was a connection between the revenue-
generating activities of the organization and the basic functions in which it was
engaged. 158 Thus, the revenue generated carried a direct functional relation to the
activities of the association. Yet in filtering through the facts, the court employed the
"business done for the patron" approach, equating its terms to include any business
done for the benefit of the patrons.15 9 The direction of the court's inquiry was
misplaced from the outset. Not only was the methodology employed by the court
inherently misdirected, but also the approach inappropriately expanded the term
"business donefor the patron" to include business done for the benefit of the patron.
Essentially, the source of the income must originate from the direct relationship of
cooperative to patron, provided that the cooperative is always performing a basic
function. The source of the income could either be derived from transactions directly
between the cooperative and its patron or from transactions between the association
and third parties, which are necessary in order for the cooperative to perform its basic
functions with or for its members.
The appellate court recognized that the sources of income at issue were not
derived from the direct relationship of cooperative and patron. The court, realizing
that the basic functions of a consumer cooperative did not include the management of
funds, 160 nevertheless concluded:
Taxpayer needs large amounts of capital to engage in this large volume merchandizing, and
turns to funding by banks. At some point in its seasonal cycle, taxpayer has a temporary
surplus of funds. To the extent possible, Cotter uses these funds to pay off debts in a manner
consistent with its cooperative purpose; where it can prepay for goods and receive a
discount, and thus lower the cost of goods to its customers, it does; where it can reduce its
indebtedness without sacrificing its necessary retention of liquidity, it does. Finally, funds
157. The Claims Court was quick to recognize the ease with which beneficial income could qualify as patronage
sourced when it stated:
Our analysis of these issues begins with the obvious observation that if Congress had intended the term "with
or for patrons" to be unlimited in scope, all income produced by cooperatives that is passed through to patrons
would be, in essence, income obtainedfor patrons, and would, therefore, be considered patronage sourced.
Cotter & Co. v. United States, 6 Ci. Ct. 219, 226 (1984) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
158. See Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Cotter's transactions
here . . . resulted from activities integrally intertwined with the cooperative's functions.").
159. The court justified its analysis by stating that "Cotter's activity, viewed in the context of its business activity,
cannot be considered an action enhancing overall profitability; merely to enhance profitability Cotter would pay off its
debt or take other more profitable action." Id. at 1107 (emphasis added).
The Federal Circuit implicitly recognized that the actions undertaken by Cotter were beneficial in increasing profit.
Yet the court relied on the business reasonableness of the revenue-generating activity and the fact that the measures used
were not the most profitable methods available. As a result, the court took refuge in believing that proper money
management was a necessity in support of a stable financial forecast and that Cotter's activities were not undertaken to
maximize investment profitability. Thereupon the court aligned itself with St. Louis Bank, indicating that to not invest
would result in a weakening of its financial base and would inevitably lead to a loss of financial resources upon which
it could otherwise draw.
160. The court stated: "Cotter serves its members by purchasing goods at the lowest prices available through large
volume purchasing, and warehousing and distributing the goods at the lowest possible cost." Id. at 1104.
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exist which must be held to allow Cotter to take advantage of any new purchasing
arrangements that will arise in the oncoming months and to assure that it can seasonally
retire its bank debt. 161
The court thus determined that the investment of surplus funds was the equivalent of
placing money in a savings account, whereupon interest would accrue. 162 Because of
Cotter's liquidity requirements, the interest generated through the investment of
surplus funds was functionally connected to the basic cooperative services it
provided. It was at this analytical juncture that the appellate court created its second
flaw.
B. The Federal Circuit Incorrectly Aligned Cotter with St. Louis Bank and Land
0' Lakes
A major problem in the reasoning underlying the Cotter opinion was recognized
originally by the appellate court iself when it stated: "We conclude . . . that the
Claims Court misapplied the analysis set forth in St. Louis Bank, . . . although the
opinion is well reasoned and, were the court writing on a clean slate, it might be
difficult to refute." 163
Fundamentally, the circuit court suggested that the trial court applied the
rationale of St. Louis Bank in reaching its conclusion, which it did not. Moreover, the
emphasis of the trial court's opinion, in part, was directed to the separation of
nonfinancial from financial cooperatives. The Claims Court, like the Court of Claims
in St. Louis Bank, drew a major functional distinction between the institutional
purpose of each type of cooperative and based its decision on this fundamental
difference.164
The plaintiff in St. Louis Bank was a nonexempt financial cooperative, chartered
by the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration under the Farm Credit Act of
1933.165 A House Report described the financial cooperatives under this Act as
follows:
There are 13 banks for cooperatives, 1 in each of the 12 farm credit districts into which
the United States is divided, with 1 to 9 states in each district, and a Central Bank for
Cooperatives in Washington, D.C. Their function is to make loans to eligible farmers'
cooperative associations engaged in marketing farm products, purchasing farm supplies, or
furnishing farm business services.66
161. Id. at 1107.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1105 (emphasis added).
164. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 219, 229 (1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Claims
Court determined:
[A]s a threshold observation . . . the facts in St. Louis Bank are fundamentally distinguishable from those of
the instant case. In St. Louis Bank, the cooperative in question was afinancial service cooperative, providing
a banking service [for] the provision of a ready source of funds for long-term or seasonal loans for its members.
Management of both surplus funds and funds to cover a deficit position was an integral part of plaintiff's
activities as a banking service cooperative.
Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added).
165. St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1046 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
166. Co.,tm-r ON Aiumctn.iuss, PRoviolNo FOR BN.s FOR CooPEAM'ns TO PAY PAR oF Ttumt PATROMAGE R.muNDs IN
MONEY, H.R. REP. No. 1368, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
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The financial cooperative in St. Louis Bank deducted from gross income, as
patronage sourced, dividends which resulted from interest on demand deposits and
interest on federal bonds. 167 The cooperative bank argued that the investment of
surplus funds was a requisite incident to the performance of its functions as a financial
cooperative. The government, on the other hand, countered that the investment
income was earned as a result of "incidental attempts to make profits that did not
facilitate directly plaintiff's banking services.' '1 68 Thus, the government argued that
the investment income did not constitute patronage dividends since these earnings
were not derived from business done with or for the patron.
The Court of Claims held that both sources of income constituted patronage-
sourced earnings and were, therefore, deductible from gross revenues pursuant to the
provisions of Subchapter T. The court not only found that the investment income was
reasonably related to the financial activities of this cooperative, 169 but also concluded
that the activities of the cooperative were integrally related to the fulfillment of its
servicing function. The court determined that "management of both surplus funds
and funds to cover a deficit position was an integral part of plaintiff's activities as [a]
banking service cooperative.' ' t 70 The court went on to say that "[t]ransactions with
third parties that are reasonably related to the business which a cooperative conducts
with its patrons; and which benefits the patron other than incidentally through the
generation of extra income, is business 'with or for' patrons."'' 1
The Federal Circuit in Cotter rejected the conclusion of the Claims Court that the
functional differentiation between financial and nonfinancial cooperative associations
inherently prevented the imposition of an analogy between them. 172 The court,
contrary to the language of Twin County Grocers,173 asserted that "St. Louis Bank
cannot be so narrowly read as to limit its application only to banking coopera-
tives."174 By focusing on the totality of the circumstances to determine relatedness,
the court was able to conclude that the similarity of income-generating transactions
167. St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1043 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
168. Id. at 1049.
169. The reasonable relationship test applied in St. Louis Bank was first employed in Linnton Plywood Ass'n v.
United States, 236 F. Supp. 227, 228 (D. Or. 1964).
170. St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ct. CI. 1980) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 1051-52.
172. The Claims Court first stated its position with respect to these fundamental, functional distinctions in Twin
County Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 657, 661 (1983). The plaintiff in Twin County, a nonexempt retail food
distribution cooperative, purchased, warehoused, and distributed food to member stores. In the course of its activities, the
plaintiff also purchased short-term certificates of deposit out of cash surpluses and deducted the earnings from these, when
distributed, as patronage-sourced dividends. Id. at 658. The Service disputed the deduction of the earnings derived from
the investment of surplus funds in certificates of deposit. Id. In support of the deduction, the cooperative asserted that the
investment income reduced the amounts it needed to borrow when it was placed in a deficit position and thereby facilitated
its operations for the benefit of its patrons. Id. In determining that this investment income was earned from sources other
than patronage, and thus was not deductible, the court reasoned:
[Ihe taxpayer cooperative in this case is principally engaged in purchasing, warehousing and distribution
functions on behalf of its member-patrons. Unlike St. Louis Bank, its main function is not to provide a banking
service. There is little, if any, evidence that money management constituted even a small part of the basic
services which it rendered.
Id. at 661.
173. 2 Cl. Ct. 657, 660-61 (1983).
174. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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in Cotter and St. Louis Bank was enough to permit the Court of Claims' method of
analysis in St. Louis Bank to apply "with equal vigor to Cotter's activities." 175 Such
a determination fails for two reasons: (1) the types of cooperatives involved; and (2)
the relatedness of the income-generating activity to the basic functions of the
cooperative.
1. Financial Versus Nonfinancial Cooperation
Income is patronage sourced when it is derived from either the direct relationship
of cooperative and patron or activity ordinarily and necessarily incident to the
association's basic functions. 176 Any income produced thereby, directly or indirectly,
carries a direct functional relationship between cooperative and patron and thus is
patronage sourced.
In St. Louis Bank, the Court of Claims stated that "[management
of... surplus funds ... was an integral part of plaintiff's activities as a banking
service cooperative." 177 In making a connection between the revenue generated from
the investment of surplus cash, the court opined:
In its management of surplus funds, plaintiff secures interest income which results in
lessening costs for the credit provided to its patrons. Plaintiff's demand loans of surplus
funds to the other farm credit system banks and the brokerage houses directly reduced the
cost of the dollars which already had been borrowed through the sale of consolidated bonds.
The transactions which generated interest income from the use of surplus funds are
integrally intertwined with the process of borrowing money to supply capital to the
cooperatives. The transactions would not occur but for the process whereby plaintiff secures
funds to lend to its members. In these circumstances, income derived from management of
surplus funds is directly related to plaintiff's services to its members and is patronage
sourced.171
Being a financial cooperative, the investment of surplus funds or funds to cover a
deficit position directly enhanced the ability of the cooperative to fulfill the purpose
for which it was designed. The revenue produced made it feasible for the cooperative
banking system, as a whole, to operate more efficiently, thereby reducing the cost of
borrowing money to its members, the basic function for which it was originally
created. 179
Cotter, on the other hand, was a nonfinancial, consumer cooperative engaged in
the purchase, warehouse, and sale of goods to its members. The connection between
the income-producing transactions in which it was involved was tangential at best. As
the Claims Court explained in Twin County Grocers with regard to a nonfinancial
cooperative: "There is little, if any, evidence that money management constituted
even a small part of the basic services which it rendered.' 8 0 Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit in Cotter equated its financial operations with those in Land 0' Lakes,
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 76-82, 116, and accompanying text.
177. St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ct. C1. 1980).
178. Id. at 1052.
179. See id.
180. Twin County Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 2 C1. Ct. 657, 661 (1983).
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Inc. v. United States.'8 1 In Land 0' Lakes, the appellant was required to purchase
stock of the bank from which it intended to borrow funds in order to qualify for
certain loans that were to be used for cooperative purposes. 182 The Eighth Circuit
found that the dividends received upon the stock constituted patronage-sourced
income and were thereby deductible as patronage dividends pursuant to section
1382.183
The Federal Circuit believed that a factual congruency existed between Cotter
and Land 0' Lakes. Referring to the record, the court found determinative the
testimony of a banking officer. The officer related that in order for Cotter to retain the
line of credit status which it held with its bank, an adequate financial position had to
be maintained. A less than satisfactory performance could lead to the imposition of
a forced financial plan.184 Yet the testimony clearly pointed out, on cross examination
of this same officer, that Cotter's line of credit would not have been terminated had
the excess cash not been invested.185 Thus, there was no requirement from Harris
Trust that Cotter do anything with its excess cash. Rather, failure to invest would only
lead to concern from a business efficiency perspective. As a result, the income
derived therefrom was not functionally connectable to the cooperative's basic
services and thereby was not patronage sourced.
There can be little doubt that proper business efficiency demands intelligent
economic integration. But to equate the deductibility of patronage dividends with
good economic sense belies the concept of cooperation. The investment of surplus
funds by Cotter reduced the costs of its bank borrowings without disabling the
cooperative from retaining liquidity. The appellate court found solace in the fact that
the methods used to generate income were not the most profitable to be had.
Therefore, the court concluded that the investment was not used to enhance
profitability. Yet this conclusion directly contradicts the trial court's findings of
fact' 86 and ignores the direct functional relationship that is required in the statute and
demanded by congressional history. In Cotter, there was no direct functional
connection between the monies received and the purchasing, warehousing, and
selling activities of the cooperative association. In fact, both the investment of surplus
funds and the leasing of excess warehouse space generated revenues that indirectly
enhanced profitability by lessening the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit,
although correctly asserting that the income-generating transaction must be viewed in
relation to all the activity undertaken to fulfill the function(s) of the cooperative,
nevertheless misapplied the language of Subchapter T under the disguise of economic
reasonableness.
181. 675 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 989.
183. Id. at 993.
184. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
185. Id. at 1108-09 (tesfimony of Mr. Nelson).
186. Cotter & Co. v. United States. 6 Cl. Ct. 219, 220-26 (1984).
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2. Financial Cooperative Associations-A Breed Apart
The Federal Circuit's major flaw in Cotter was its erroneous determination that
the "income-generating transactions [in Cotter were]... remarkably similar to
those in [St. Louis Bank]." ' 18 7 Such a conclusion, appearing facially correct, failed to
distinguish the basic service activities of the banking cooperative from producer or
consumer cooperative organizations. A House Report addressing the withdrawal of
government funds from the entire system of cooperative banks separated the financial
from the nonfinancial association. The Report, referring to the effect of Subchapter
T on the investment of surplus funds by banking cooperatives, stated:
Another requirement of Subchapter T, if the patronage allocations and refunds of a
bank for cooperatives are to be deductible from the gross income in computing taxable
income, is that the amount involved shall come within the definition of a patronage dividend
as that term is defined in Subchapter T. One element of the definition is that such amounts
come out of earnings from business done with or for patrons. In the case of a bank for
cooperatives, practically all or at least as much as 95 percent of its gross income comes as
a result of the loans made to the farmers' cooperatives that borrow from the bank. There also
may be a very minor amount of income from securities in which a bank may invest and from
temporary surplus funds that it may have loaned to other banks of the cooperative farm credit
system. These latter amounts are relatively insignificant and the intention is that it should not
be necessary to distinguish them from the interest collected on loans insofar as concerns
being derived from business with or for the borrowing cooperatives.S
This Report is indicative of the treatment to be afforded only cooperative banks.
The statement supports the position asserted in the regulations to Subchapter T that,
unless excepted, money management is neither directly related to nor a necessary
incident to the basic purchasing, marketing, or service activities of a nonbanking,
cooperative association and therefore cannot qualify as income derived out of
business done with or for patrons.18 9
3. The Treasury Regulations were in Disagreement with the Federal Circuit's
Holding
Finally, Judge Nichols of the Federal Circuit seems to totally brush aside in
Cotter the treasury regulation, whose validity was not questioned by the Claims
Court, 190 which states that interest income and rental income derived from the leasing
of business premises constitute incidental income which does not qualify as patronage
sourced.' 91 Absent a functional connection, therefore, any attempt by a cooperative
to engage in such activities would lead to revenue generation outside the basic
services provided by the cooperative itself. Fundamentally, any income produced by
187. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
188. Cowrav= ; O. AGRicuLuaR, supra note 166, at 4. Accord supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1382-3(c)(2) (1986).
190. As the Court of Claims stated with respect to treasury regulations: "A court may accord great weight to a
longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by the agency charged with its administration." St. Louis Bank for Coops.
v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75
(1973) and Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1946)).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.1382-3(c)(2) (1986).
1986]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
these extrafunctional transactions would be merely for the creation of profit, which
is the antithesis of cooperation, 92 and would be considered nonpatronage-sourced
income. It was for this reason that the trial court in Cotter correctly aligned itself with
the facts and conclusions of Twin County Grocers and distinguished the activity by
Cotter from that of the appellant in St. Louis Bank.
VI. THE Two-TIERED ANALYTICAL APPROACH-A MODEST PROPOSAL 19 3
In Part V of this Comment it was shown that the Court of Claims employed a
direct relationship test in applying the letter of Subchapter T to a financial
cooperative.' 94 Subsequent to the St. Louis Bank case, the Claims Court modified this
connective method of analysis by determining that the activity generating the income,
in order to be patronage sourced, need only facilitate the basic marketing, purchasing,
or service activities of the cooperative.' 95 This facilitation approach more closely
approximated the reasonable relationship test employed by the Federal District Court
of Oregon in Linnton Plywood Association v. United States.196 More recently, the
Federal Circuit has created a more expansive mode of analysis with regard to
patronage-sourced dividends when it concluded that the economic realities of the
situation in Cotter necessitated the investment of surplus funds.' 97
Although based on the same statute, though all four tests employed appear to be
facially similar in nature, and despite the fact that each situation enjoyed circum-
stances that differed, in part, from the others, it is apparent that the initial questions
on which the courts should have focused were blurred. The different types of
cooperatives involved, the various fact patterns that have arisen, and the multitude of
analytical lenses employed by the courts have led to kaleidescopic results with respect
to I.R.C. section 1388. The only conclusion to be had from the disparate answers that
have been given by the several courts is that there is no single, fundamental approach
taken in resolving the ultimate issue of whether an item of income is derived from
patronage sources and thereby qualifies as a patronage-sourced dividend pursuant to
I.R.C. section 1382.
192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193. This proposal is not intended to include financial type cooperative organizations which are inherently separate
and distinct from all other cooperative associations and which thereby are to be afforded special consideration based on
their unique method of operations.
194. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
195. See Cotter & Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 219, 228 (1984); Twin County Grocers, Inc. v. United States,
2 Cl. Ct. 657, 662 (1983). See also Rev. Rul. 69-576, 1969-2 C.B. 166, which states:
The classification of an item of income as from either patronage or nonpatronage sources is dependent on the
relationship of the activity generating the income to the marketing, purchasing, or service activities of the
cooperative. If the income is produced by a transaction which actually facilitates the accomplishment of the
cooperatives' marketing, purchasing, or service activities, the income is from patronage sources. However, if
the transaction producing the income does not actually facilitate the accomplishment of these activities but
merely enhances the overall profitability of the cooperative, being merely incidental to the association's
cooperative operation, the income is from nonpatronage sources.
Id.
196. 410 F. Supp. 1100, 1106 (D. Or. 1976).
197. Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'g, 6 Cl. Ct. 219 (1984).
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As was previously discussed, there are two basic types of nonfinancial
cooperatives-producer and consumer. 98 In conjunction therewith it has been
suggested that the "with or for" language of section 1388 of the Code is applicable,
separately, to each of these two exclusive organizations. 99 Thus, the initial question
requires that the fundamental type of cooperative involved be determined. Only then
can the basic functions performed by the association be defined and integrated into
the appropriate division of the bifurcated language of section 1388.200 The cooper-
ative that operates in furtherance of the economic welfare of its members in their
capacity as consumers is the consumer type association. At the core of the
applicability of Subchapter T to the consumer cooperative is whether the activity
undertaken by the organization is business done with patrons pursuant to section 1388
of the Code. On the other hand, the producer type association promotes the economic
well-being of its members in their capacity as producers of goods. The language to
be applied against these cooperative organizations in compliance with section 1388
depends upon whether the transactions between the cooperative and member or
between cooperative and third person has resulted in business done for the patron.
The result of this initial inquiry would allow the court's focus to be defined from the
outset and would lessen the possibility of the trier of law misconstruing the letter and
intent of Subchapter T.
Once the proper analytical framework is erected (the trier of fact has determined
what type of cooperative association is involved), the court may then attempt to draw
a connection, or form a relationship, between the revenue-generating activity and the
basic functions of the cooperative. At this juncture, the methodological approach
divides into two tiers. At the first level, if the revenue is generated from activities
occurring directly between cooperative and patron and if the revenue is produced
from an activity that is part of the cooperative's basic functions, then the income is
patronage sourced, functionally direct, and the taxpayer may properly deduct the
overcharge as a patronage dividend upon its proportional distribution to the patron. 20 '
Any income which fails to meet both of these conditions cannot be functionally
direct, patronage-sourced revenue. Nevertheless, patronage-sourced income by
definition is not unidimensional. Income which carries a direct functional relationship
to the cooperative represents the connective method of analysis in its most simple
form. The more difficult and evasive question arises in the second tier, where the
source of the revenue does not have a direct functional connection to the basic
activities of the association.
198. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
200. In Part III of this Comment, it was shown that section 1388 of the Code was divisible into two exclusive parts-
business done with patrons and business done for patrons. The former applies only to consumer cooperatives, while the
latter applies only to producer associations. See supra text accompanying notes 43-116.
201. The basic support for this first tier can be found in the statements of Senator Williams which were printed in
Part III of this Comment. The Senator defined the patronage dividend, for both the consumer and producer cooperative,
to include direct functional earnings and indirect functional revenues which resulted from transactions that were ordinarily
and necessarily incident to the basic functions of the cooperative. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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It is obvious, by definition, that the basic functions provided by the consumer
cooperative differ dramatically from those of the producer association. Not so
apparent, however, is the fact that cooperatives of the same type may differ in the
basic functions they provide for their patrons. Income which does not accrue to the
cooperative organization by way of the first tier (functionally direct) may nevertheless
be found to be patronage sourced where there is a connection between the activity
generating the income and the basic purchasing, marketing, or service activities of the
cooperative. Because the types of functions attributable to cooperative associations
are numerous, and since the facts and circumstances in which the organization must
operate are and will continue to be exclusive in nature and effect, the final
determination of what constitutes patronage-sourced income must occur on an ad hoc
basis. Nevertheless, there are guidelines available from which a court may seek aid
in applying the terms of Subchapter T to items of income that filter down to the
second tier-indirect functional income.
Indirect functional earnings are those items of income produced by a cooperative
that occur outside the direct relationship of cooperative and patron or that are derived
from the direct relationship of cooperative and patron but are not within the basic
functions of the cooperative. Income which qualifies as functionally direct may not
be reconsidered to be functionally indirect. Once defined, any attempt at a
redefinition would result in a negative alteration of the meaning of indirect functional
earnings. The major problem incurred by the courts with respect to defining
"patronage-sourced income" under I.R.C. section 1388 has resulted from the
amorphous nature of these indirect functional earnings and their interrelated effect on
the basic functions of the association.
The first step to be made in resolving the functionally indirect patronage-
sourced income issue exists in the creation of a connection between the revenue
producing activity and the basic marketing, purchasing, or service activities of the
organization. In order to create this connection, it is imperative that the taxpayer
define the source of the income, the functional purpose of the activity which
generated the revenue, and the relative significance of the activity which generated
the income within the framework of the purpose for which the cooperative
organization was designed and created. Once a connection has been established, the
next requirement, as has been demonstrated through the legislative history, rests
upon the ability of the taxpayer to show that the income-producing activity was an
ordinary and necessary incident to the basic functions of the cooperative. 20 2 The test
is not premised upon but-for causation as was suggested in St. Louis Bank.20 3
Rather, the finder of fact must conclude that there is a necessary functional
relationship between the activity which produced the income and the basic
202. See id.
203. See St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1052 (Ct. CI. 1980) (the transactions would
not have occurred but for the process whereby plaintiff secures funds to lend its members). For a more complete discussion
of the court's opinion, see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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marketing, purchasing, and service operations provided by the cooperative and for
which it was created. 204
To summarize, the bifurcated method of examination under the literal terms of
I.R.C. section 1388 would protect against the interchange of terms to accommodate
the interests of the cooperative. The language has been drawn up and separated in
such a way as to prevent an expansive application of the phrase "business done with
or for patrons," yet allows flexibility in the creation of a connection between the
activity that generates the income and the basic functions in which the organization
is engaged. The terms of Subchapter T are not premised solely upon the economic
benefits to be had by the patron. In order to retain the fundamental responsibility in
the fulfillment of the purposes for which it was set up, it is necessary in the definition
of "patronage-sourced dividends" that the analysis to be employed focus upon the
type of cooperative involved, the basic functions of the cooperative, the activity
generating the income, the connection to be had between the revenue created and the
basic functions of the association in the fulfillment of the fiduciary responsibilities
owed to the member patrons, and the significance of the income-generating
transaction in relation to the aggregate of the cooperative's basic functional activities.
Any items of income produced by the cooperative which do not meet the conditions
of either tier one (direct functionality) or tier two (indirect functionality) constitute
revenue produced outside the functional operations of the cooperative and can be
defined only as nonpatronage-sourced income. Such earnings would thereby be
disqualified from Subchapter T treatment and would be subject to taxation under the
corporate tax tables.
VII. CONCLUSION
The formation of cooperatives has led to substantial benefits not only to the
members of the association, but to the public as well. The reduction in expenses and
the stabilization of prices through lessened competition have allowed cooperative
members to assist one another economically without imposing a financial burden
upon the ultimate consumer. In fact, part of the financial benefit that has occurred as
a result of the organizing of cooperatives is traceable to the consuming public itself.
Congress apparently is reluctant to disregard the positive social impact of the
cooperative association. The evolution and use of this type of business has expanded
continuously, due in part to the tax benefits permitted under Subchapter T of the
Internal Revenue Code. Recent case law, however, fails to properly address the
restrictions imposed by the tax laws as intended by Congress. Absent an interpreta-
tion of the Code that would implement congressional intent and legislative history,
the potential for abuse under Subchapter T remains a possibility.
204. The trial court in Coiter narrowly perceived the directly related, necessary incident test to be applicable only
where the revenue-producing activity was a part of the cooperative's basic functions. The Federal Circuit correctly
expanded the inquiry to include those earnings generated by the association as they were applied in the business
environment to which they were related. The court determined that to limit its income-generating characteristics to the
activity producing the income would be inappropriate "when such a characterization [would not be] consistent with the
actual activity." Cotter & Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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This Comment has explained the concept of cooperation, has explored the
evolution of Subchapter T of the current Code, and has evaluated in part the holding
of the Federal Circuit in the Cotter case. Moreover, this Comment has attempted to
implement a workable, flexible direct relationship test in applying the terms of
Subchapter T by bifurcating the "business done with or for patrons" language of
I.R.C. section 1388 and employing a two-tiered method of analysis for earnings
created by the cooperative in the fulfillment of its basic functions. The criticisms of
the Cotter case simply emphasize the need for a better understanding of the tax laws
applicable to cooperatives and are intended to present a viable alternative to the
current methodologies used to resolve conflicts surrounding Subchapter T, particu-
larly section 1388. The key questions to be answered in reaching the ultimate issues
addressed herein are conditioned on the facts surrounding the matter. Yet the
language and effect of Subchapter T will presumably remain constant. As a result,
any test to determine the taxation of cooperative income should be implemented in an
objective and workable fashion in order to reach an understandable, logical
conclusion.
Robert P. Carlisle
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